Epistemic game theory has shown the importance of informational contexts to understand strategic interaction. We propose a general framework to analyze how such contexts may arise.
Background and Motivation
An increasingly popular 1 view is that "the fundamental insight of game theory [is] that a rational player must take into account that the players reason about each other in deciding how to play" [4, pg. 81]. Exactly how the players (should) incorporate the fact that they are interacting with other (actively reasoning) agents into their own decision making process is the subject of much debate.
A variety of frameworks have been put forward to explicitly model the reasoning of rational agents in a strategic situation. Key examples include Brian Skyrms' models of "dynamic deliberation" [30] , Ken Binmore's analysis of "eductive reasoning" [9] , and Robin Cubitt and Robert Sugden's "common modes of reasoning" [15] . Although the details of these frameworks are quite different 2 , they share a common line of thought: Contrary to classical game theory, solution concepts are no longer the basic object of study. Instead, the "rational solutions" of a game are the result of individual (rational) decisions in specific informational "contexts".
This perspective on the foundations of game theory is best exemplified by the so-called epistemic program in game theory (cf. [12] ). The central thesis here is that the basic mathematical model of a game should include an explicit parameter describing the players' informational attitudes. However, this broadly decision-theoretic stance does not simply reduce the question of decision-making in interaction to that of rational decision making in the face of uncertainty or ignorance. Crucially, Thus, a player can be rationally criticized for not choosing what is best given one's information, but also for not reasoning in or to a "proper" context. Of course, what counts as a "proper" context is debatable. There might be rational pressure for or against making certain substantive assumptions 4 2 Skyrms assumes the players deliberate by calculating their expected utility and then use this new information to recalculate their probabilities about the states of the world and recalculate their expected utilities. Binmore models the players as Turing machines that can compute their rational choices. And, Cubitt and Sugden build on David Lewis' analysis of common knowledge in terms (inductive/deductive) rules that are commonly accepted among all the players. 3 And so, strategic behavior depends, in part, on the players' higher-order beliefs. However, some care is needed about what precisely is being claimed. The well-known email game of Ariel Rubinstein [28] demonstrates that misspecification of arbitrarily high-orders of beliefs can have a large impact on (predicted) strategic behavior. So, there are simple examples where (predicted) strategic behavior is too sensitive to the players higher-order beliefs. We are not claiming that a rational agent is required to consider all higher-order beliefs, but only that a rational player recognizes that her opponents are actively reasoning rational agents, and this means that a rational player does take into account some of her higher-order beliefs (eg., what she believes her opponents believes that she will do) as she deliberates. Precisely, "how much" higher-order information should be taken into account is a very interesting open question which we set aside for this paper. 4 The notion of substantive assumption is explored in more detail in [27] , and the references therein.
about the beliefs of one's opponents, for instance to always entertain the possibility that one of the players might not choose optimally.
Recently, researchers using methods from dynamic-epistemic logic have taken steps into understanding this idea of reasoning to a "proper" or "rational" context [8, 7, 6, 34] . Building on this literature, and, more generally, on the rich repertoire of notions of belief (eg., safe belief, strong belief) and informative actions (eg., radical upgrade, conservative upgrade) from modern dynamic-epistemic logic 5 , we provide here a general characterization of when players can or cannot rationally reason to specific informational contexts (Section 2). We then apply this framework to issues surrounding the epistemic characterization of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS), aka iterated admissibility (Section 3).
Belief Dynamics for Strategic Games
The main idea of this paper is to understand well-known solutions concepts not in terms of fixed informational contexts-for instance, models (eg., type spaces or epistemic models) satisfying rationality and common belief of rationality-but rather as a result of a dynamic, interactive process of information exchanges. It is important to note that the goal is not to represent some type of "pre-play communication" or form of "cheap talk". Instead, the goal is to represent the process of rational deliberation that takes the players from the ex ante stage to the ex interim stage of decision making. Thus, the "informational exchanges" are the result of the players practical reasoning about what they should do, given their current beliefs. In this section, we introduce our framework incorporating ideas from the extensive literature on dynamic logics of belief revision (cf. [33, 6] ) and recent work on a "reasoning-based approach to game theory" [16, 15] .
Describing the Informational Context
Let G = N, {S i } i∈N , u i be a strategic game. 6 The informational context of a game describes the players' hard and soft information about the possible outcomes of the game. The players have opinions about which of states (each state is associated with an outcome of the game) are more or less plausible among the ones they have not ruled out. Since we are representing the rational deliberation process, we do not assume that the players have made up their minds about which actions they will choose. We start with the simplest model of beliefs: a set of states where each state is associated with a possible outcome of the game and a single plausibility ordering (which is reflexive, transitive and connected) w v that says "v is at least as plausible as w."
Originally used as a semantics for conditionals (cf. [22] ), these plausibility models have been extensively used by logicians [32, 33, 6] , game theorists [10] and computer scientists [11, 21] to represent rational agents' (all-out) beliefs. Thus, we take for granted that they provide natural models of (multiagent) beliefs and focus on how they can be used to represent "rational deliberation"
in a game situation. We first settle on some notation. assigning strategy profiles to each state. To simplify notation, we write σ i (w) for (σ(w)) i (similarly, write σ −i (w) for the sequence of strategies of all players except i). For each a ∈ S i , we write P i a = {w ∈ W | σ i (w) = a} for the set of states where player i chooses a (this is the proposition "i selects strategy a"). Furthermore, we write P i a ∧ P j b for the set-theoretic intersection of P i a and P j b , P i a ∨ P j b for the set-theoretic union of P i a and P j b and ¬P i a for the set-theoretic complement of P i a .
We can now define the informational context of a game.
where is a connected, reflexive, transitive and well-founded 7 relation on W and σ is a strategy function on
Note that there is only one plausibility ordering in the above model, yet we are interested in games with more than one player. There are different ways to interpret the fact that there is only one plausibility ordering. The models can represent the beliefs of one of the players before she has made up her mind about which option to choose. Alternatively, we can think the model as 7 Well-foundedness is only needed to ensure that for any set X, the set of minimal elements in X is nonempty. This is important only when W is infinite -and there are ways around this in current logics. Moreover, the condition of connectedness can also be lifted, but we use it here for convenience.
describing a stage of the rational deliberation of all the players starting from an initial model where all the players have the same beliefs (i.e., the common prior). The private information about which possibilities the players consider possible given their actual choice can then be defined from the conditional beliefs. For X ⊆ W , let M in (X) = {v ∈ X | v w for all w ∈ X } be the set of minimal elements of X according to .
Definition 2.3 (Belief and Conditional Belief ) Let M G = W, , σ be a model of a game G. We define the following. Let E and F be subsets of W , we say
Other notions of beliefs have been studied (eg. strong belief and safe belief), but, for this paper, we keep things simple and focus on the above standard notions.
Of course, this model can (and has: see [6, 33] ) be extended to include beliefs for each of the players, an explicit relation representing the player(s) hard information or by making the plausibility orders state-dependent. To keep things simple, we focus on models with a single plausibility ordering.
A Primer on Belief Dynamics
We are not interested in informational contexts per se, but rather how the informational context changes during the process of rational deliberation. The type of change we are interested in is how a model M G of a game G incorporates new information about what the players should do (according to a particular choice rule). As is well-known from the belief revision literature, there are many ways to transform an epistemic-doxastic model given some new information [26] . We do not have the space to survey this entire literature here (see [33, 5] for modern introductions).
Instead we sketch some key ideas. The picture below illustrates different ways a plausibility model can incorporate the proposition ϕ (thought of a set of states).
The general approach is to define a way of transforming a plausibility model M G given a proposition ϕ. That is, the idea is to define a transformation τ that maps plausibility models and propositions to plausibility models (we write M The answer to this question will depend on a number of factors. The general picture is
where each D i is some proposition and τ is model transformer (eg., public announcement, radical upgrade or conservative upgrade). Two questions are important for the analysis of this process.
First, what type of transformations are being used by the players? For example, if τ is a public announcement, then it is not hard to see that, for purely logical reasons, this process must eventually stop at a limit model (see [6] Suspending Judgement It is well-known that, in general, there are no rational principles of decision making (under ignorance or uncertainty) which always recommend a unique choice. In particular, it is not hard to find a game and an informational context where there is at least one player without a unique "rational choice" (see the discussion in the next section for concrete examples). How should a rational player incorporate the information that more than one action is classified as "choice-worthy" or "rationally permissible" (according to some choice rule) for her opponent(s)? One natural response is to suspend judgement about which options the relevant players will pick. Making use of a well-known distinction of Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Sidney
Morgenbesser [31] , the assumption that all players are rational can help determine which options the player will choose, but rationality alone does not help determined which of the rationally permissible options will be "picked". This line of thought led Cubitt and Sugden to impose a "privacy of tie breaking" property which says that players cannot know that her opponent will not pick an option that is classified as "choice-worthy" [15, pg. 8] . Wlodeck Rabinovich takes this even further and argues that from the principle of indifference, players must assign equal probability to all choice-worthy options [25] . What interests us is how to transform a plausibility model to incorporate the fact that there is a set of choice-worthy options for (some of) the players.
We do not offer an extended discussion of belief suspension here, but suggest that a generalization of conservative upgrade is the notion we are looking for (Wes Holliday makes the same point in [19] ). The idea is to do an upgrade with a set of propositions {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n } by letting the most plausible worlds be the union of each of the most plausible ϕ i worlds. Formally, 
..,ϕn} x for all x ∈ W , and 2. for all x, y ∈ W − B, x ↑{ϕ 1 ,...,ϕn} y iff x y.
Note that this is indeed a generalizaiton of conservative upgrade, since in general, best(
Thus, this is not the same as performing a conservative upgrade with ϕ 1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕ n (where the most plausible worlds are the most plausible worlds satisfying at least one of the ϕ i ). A simple suspension of a belief in ϕ can be represented as ↑ {ϕ, ¬ϕ}. This transformation is illustrated below.
Remembering Reasons A generalized conservative upgrade of {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n } "flattens" out the players belief relative to this set of propositions. After the upgrade, the player will consider each of the ϕ i equally plausible. But this means that, if w is a most plausible ϕ i -world and v is a most plausible ϕ j -world, the player forgets whatever reason she had for considering state w more plausible than v (or vice versa). This suggests a generalization of radical upgrade (cf. the picture above on the right) where the player(s) remember their earlier reasons for considering some states more plausible than others. Again the idea is to upgrade with a set of propositions {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n } as above, but maintain the original ordering within the union of the most plausible ϕ i -worlds. as follows: W ⇑{ϕ 1 ,...,ϕn} = W , σ ⇑{ϕ 1 ...,ϕn} = σ and for all i ∈ N and w ∈ W ⇑{ϕ 1 ,...,ϕn} we have: let
2. for all x, y ∈ B, x ⇑{ϕ 1 ,...,ϕn} y iff x y, and 3. for all x, y ∈ W − B, x ⇑{ϕ 1 ,...,ϕn} y iff x y.
We illustrate both transformations below:
We will see other examples of these transformation in the next section. These transformations can be logically analyzed using standard techniques from dynamic epistemic/doxastic logic literature (eg., the "reduction axiom method").
Theorem 2.6 Both generalized conservative upgrade and generalized radical upgrade can be completely axiomatized over class of plausibility models over a static language including operators for belief, conditional belief and knowledge.
For the proof, we need to generalize the reduction axioms for radical and conservative upgrade (see [33] for a discussion of this method of proving completeness). Since the logic of these transformations is not the focus of this paper, we do not include the proof here.
Practical Reasoning in Games
We do not intend the dynamic operations of belief change discussed in the previous section to directly represent the (practical) reasoning of the players as they deliberate about what to do in a game situation. In fact, we do not represent directly any formal model of practical reasoning.
Instead, following Cubitt and Sugden [15] , we assume that during each stage of rational deliberation, the players can categorize their available options. Thus, we treat practical reasoning as a "black box" and focus on general choice rules that are intended to describe rational decision making (under ignorance).
To make this precise, we need some notation:
Definition 2.7 (Strategies in Play) Let G = N, {S i } i∈N , {u i } i∈N be a strategic game and
For each i ∈ N , the strategies in play for i at w is the set
is the strategies that player i still believes are possible at some stage of the deliberation process represented by the model M G . Given these beliefs, we assume that each player can categorize her available options:
Note that, in general, a categorization need not be a partition (i.e., S [16] for an example of such a categorization. However, in the remainder of this paper, we focus on familiar choice rules where the categorization does form a partition. Typically, we are interested in a "categorization method", i.e., rules for defining a categorization given any game. Two standard examples are weak and strong dominance: Let G = N, {S i } i∈N , {u i } i∈N be a strategic game and M G an model of G. Then, Strong Dominance (pure strategies) For each i and a ∈ S i ,
and
Weak Dominance (pure strategies) For each i and a ∈ S i ,
and there is some
. Both of the above definitions can be modified to cover strict/weak dominance by mixed strategies, but we leave issues about how to incorporate probabilities into the framework sketched in this paper for another time.
Responding to Practical Reasoning
In this section, we merge the two perspectives (rational dynamics of belief from Section 2.2 and context-dependent practical reasoning of Section 2.3. The idea is that the "rational response" for a player to a given categorization is to transform the current informational context (using one of the transformations from the Section 2.2) by incorporating this information. To make this precise, we need to describe a categorization. Definition 2.9 (Language for a Game) Let G = N, {S i } i∈N , {u i } i∈N be a strategic game.
Without loss of generality, assume that each of the S i are disjoint and let At G = {P i a | a ∈ S i } be a set of atomic formulas (one for each a ∈ S i ). The propositional language for G, denoted L G , is the smallest set of formulas containing At G and closed under the boolean connectives ¬ and ∧. The other boolean connectives (∨, →, ↔) are defined as usual.
Formulas of L G are intended to describe possible outcomes of the game. Given an informational context of a game M G , the formulas ϕ ∈ L G is can be associated with subsets of the set of states in the usual way:
by induction on the structure of L G as follows:
Let X and Y be two sets of propositions, we define X ∧ Y := {ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ ∈ X, ψ ∈ Y } Definition 2.11 (Describing a categorization) Let G be a game and M G an informational context of G. Given a categorization S(M G ), let Do(S(M G )) denote the set of formulas that describe S. This set is defined as follows: for each i ∈ N let:
The general project is to understand the interaction between types of categorizations (eg., choice rules) and types of model transformations (representing the rational deliberation process). One key question, is does (and under what conditions) a deliberation process stabilize? There are a number of ways to make precise what it means to stabilize (see [6] for a discussion). In general there are many (rational) ways to incorporate a (description of) a categorization into a plausibility model. Section 2.2 discussed two natural update rules (generalized conservative upgrade and generalized radical upgrade). In the remainder of this section, we discuss a number of abstract principles which guarantee that a rational deliberation will stabilize. We start by being more precise about the "rational deliberation process" and what it means to stabilize. We write M ≡ B M is M and M are stable with respect to beliefs.
In this paper, it is enough to define stabilization in terms of the players simple beliefs. This is because, during the process of deliberation, we only incorporate ground information about what the players are going to do (as opposed to higher-order information 9 ). We are now ready to formally define a "deliberation sequence": Definition 2.13 (Upgrade Sequence) Given a game G and an informational context M G , an upgrade sequence of type τ , induced by M G is an infinite sequence of plausibility models (M m ) m∈N defined as follows:
An upgrade sequence stabilizes if there is an n ≥ 0 such that M n = M n+1 .
The next section has a number of examples of upgrade streams, some that stabilize and others that do not stabilize. We now discuss some abstract principles that ensure that the categorizations are "sensitive" to the players beliefs and that the players respond to the categorizations in the appropriate way. There are two main reasons why an upgrade stream would stabilize. The first is due to the properties of the transformation (for example, it is clear that upgrade streams with public announcements always stabilize). The second is because the choice rule satisfies a monotonicity property so that, eventually, the categorizations stabilizes, and no new transformations can change the plausibility ordering.
To state these properties more precisely, we need some notation. Let U be a fixed set of states and G a fixed strategic game. We restrict attention to transformations between models of G whose states come from the universe of states U . Let M G be the set of all such plausibility models. A model transformation then is a function that maps a model of G and a finite set of formulas of L G to a model in M G :
where ℘ <ω (L G ) is the set of finite subsets of L G . Of course, not all transformations τ make sense in this context. We give a number of abstract principles that τ must satisfy so that the categorizations and belief transformation τ are connected in the "right way". Let X = {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n } be a finite set
A1
The operation τ depends only on the truth set of the formulas: If for each i = 1, . . . , n,
Property A1 says that the belief transformations depend only on the proposition expressed by a formula ϕ by treating equivalent formulas the same way. The second property A2 says that receiving the exact same information twice does not have any effect on the players' beliefs. These are general properties of the belief transformation. Certainly, there are other natural properties that one may want to impose (for example, variants of the AGM postulates [1] ), but, for the time being, we are interested in the minimal principles needed to prove a stabilization result.
The next set of properties make sure that the transformation respond "properly" to a categorization. First, we need a property to guarantee that the categorizations only depend on the players' beliefs:
10 Here it is crucial that the language LG does not contain any modalities.
Finally, we need to ensure that in all upgrade sequences respond to the categorizations in the right way.
In particular, Mon − means that once an option for a player is classified as "not rationally permissible", it cannot, at a later stage of the deliberation process, drop this classification.
Theorem 2.14 Suppose that G is a finite game and all of the above properties are satisfied. Then every upgrade sequence (M n ) n∈N stabilizes.
Proof. Let G = N, {S i } i∈N , {u i } i∈N be a finite strategic game. By properties Mon − and Mon + we have either for all upgrade streams (M n ) n∈N and players i ∈ N ,
Since each S i is assumed to be finite, for each player i, there is a n i such that
All that remains is to show that for all x > m, M x = τ (M x ). This follows by an easy induction on x. The key calculation is: for each x ∈ N, let D x be the appropriate description of
This concludes the proof. qed
The role of monotonicity of the choice has been noticed by a number of researchers (see [3] for a discussion). We do not discuss the proof here 11 , but note some interesting corollaries:
15 If the categorization method is strict dominance, then any upgrade sequence of type τ stabilizes, where τ is any of the transformations discussed in this paper (eg., public announcement, (generalized) radical upgrade and (generalized) conservative upgrade).
Corollary 2.16
If τ is public announcement or (generalized) radical upgrade, then any belief sensitive categorization method stabilizes on any upgrade sequence.
This generalizes van Benthem's analysis of rational dynamics [8] to soft information, both in terms of attitudes and announcements. It also explains Apt and Zvesper's results about stabilization of beliefs, even for admissibility [2] : they use public announcements, which stabilizes beliefs.
Case Study: Admissibility
Larry Samuelson [29] pointed out an explicit puzzle surrounding the epistemic foundations of IEWDS -also known as the IA solution [13] . He showed (among other things) that there is no epistemic model of the following game with at least one state satisfying "common knowledge of admissibility" (i.e., a state where there is common knowledge that the players do not play a strategy that is weakly dominated).
11 The proof is available upon request.
The general framework introduced above offers a new, dynamic perspective on this result, and on reasoning with admissibility more generally. 12 
Generalized Conservative Upgrade with Admissibility
Dynamically, the non-existence of a model of the above game in which admissibility is common belief 13 corresponds to non-stabilization of upgrade streams. Agents are not able to reason their way to stable, common belief in admissibility. To capture this intuition we need to work with a non-monotonic upgrade rule. We choose here generalized conservative upgrade. We explain in more detail this modeling choice in discussion at the end of Section 3.2.
Observation 3.1 Starting with the initial full model of the above game, 14 conservative upgrade stream of rational response with admissibility does not stabilize.
The looping stream of conservative upgrades is illustrated in the figure above. The formal details are in the appendix. Intuitively: From M 0 to M 2 the agents have reasons to exclude d and R, leading them to commonly believe that u, L is played. At that stage, however, d is admissible for Ann, canceling the reason that agents had to rule out this strategy. The rational response here is thus to suspend judgment on d, leading to M 3 . In this new model, the agents are similarly led to 12 We do not to provide an alternative epistemic characterization of this solution concept. Both [13] and [18] have convincing results here. Our goal is to use this solution concept as illustration of our general approach. 13 We use common plain beliefs here instead of common knowledge. 14 A full model is one where it is common knowledge that each of the outcomes of the game equally likely (i.e., all outcomes of the game are in the model and are equally plausible).
suspend judgment on not playing R, bringing them back to M 0 . This process loops forever; the agents' reasoning does not stabilize.
A corollary of Observation 3.1 is that common belief in admissibility is not sufficient for stabilization of upgrade streams. Stabilization also require that all and only those profiles that are most plausible are admissible. Admissibility needs to be a common assumption [14] . To show this we need the following notion. The set B 0 is just the set of most plausible states (the "simple" beliefs). The set B n+1 fixes beliefs conditional on not being in any of the state in 0≤n B n . We write M |= B n Adm j whenever j plays an admissible strategy in all most plausible states at level n.
Observation 3.4 Let M be a model for a given game.
(i) {s : there is a w ∈ M in [W ] with σ(w) = s} is a tight admissible set.
(
Proof. Unpacking the definitions. qed
Tight admissible sets are thus those that are played exactly under, first, common belief in admissibility and, second, common conditional beliefs, for any degree n > 0, that no other strategies would have been admissible for any other players. Stabilization of rational, conservative upgrades with admissibility is equivalent to establishing common assumption of admissibility.
Upgrade streams based on generalized conservative upgrade and admissibility, if they stabilize, need not do so on the IA solution, nor on self-admissible sets (SAS) [13] .
Observation 3.5 There are self-admissible sets that are not tightly admissible. Finally, we note that for a given game there can be many tight admissible sets.
Observation 3.7 For a given game G there can be many tight admissible sets.
Proof. Take the 8 × 8 matrix constituted of one copy of the game in Observation ?? in the top-left quadrant, and another copy in the bottom-right quadrant. Both player get 0 on all the other profiles, i.e. top-right and bottom-left quadrants. The tight admissible sets in each copies of the game above are also tight admissible in this bigger game, and also the set of profiles formed by the product of strategies in the union of these two closed admissible sets 15 . qed
Generalized Radical Upgrade with Admissibility
Generalized radical upgrade stabilizes plain beliefs, and as showed above this is sufficient to guarantee stabilization of rational responses, even for non-monotonic choice rules like admissibility.
The game on page 16 is an illuminating special case. Starting with the full model of this game, the upgrade stream stabilizes on a model with common belief in admissibility. Again we only show the figure, and leave the formal details to the reader.
Intuitively, what happens is the following: Just like for conservative upgrade, M 0 and M 1 , respectively, give the agents reasons to believe that Ann will not play d, and that Bob will not play R. This leads to M 2 where, like before, d is admissible given that Ann believes that Bob plays L.
Radical update, however, doesn't allow this fact to overwrite the reason she had not to play d: her rational response is to rank u, L and d, L above all other possible outcomes, but to keep the relative ordering of these two, reflecting the fact that she previously ruled out u.
Stabilization of radical upgrade puts Samuelson's observation into perspective. Such upgrade forces the agents to remember the reasons they had earlier in the deliberation. Previous reasons constraint the domain of permissibility at later stages in the reasoning process. What is permissible for Ann at M 2 depends on the reasoning process that led to this model, and in particular on the 15 Note that this is not the case in general.
existence of an (earlier) reason not to play d. This was not the case for conservative upgrade.
Reasons, at each stage, were evaluated de novo, without references to the preceding reasoning history. This is what led the upgrade stream for Samuelson's game into looping, to the "paradox" of admissibility.
We leave it open for discussion whether this constitutes an argument to the effect that agents "should" keep track of their reasons while reasoning to a specific informational context.
For now we content ourselves with the observation that there is a tight connection, on the one hand, between remembering one's reasons and stabilization of reasoning under admissibility and, on the other hand, between letting new reasons override previous ones and the possibility of never-ending reasoning chains.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we proposed a general framework to analyze how "proper" or "rational" information contexts my arise. We showed general conditions for stabilization of sequences of rational responses to incoming information, in terms structural properties of both the decision rule and the information update policy. In the course of doing so we generalized existing rules for information update used in the dynamic-epistemic logic literature. We then applied this framework to admissibility, giving a dynamic analysis of Samuelson's non-existence result, as well as characterizing stabilization of iterated rational response to admissibility under two different rules for information update.
Throughout the paper we worked with (logical) models of all out attitudes, leaving aside probabilistic, graded beliefs, even though the later are arguably the most widely used in the current literature on epistemic foundations of game theory. It is an important, but non-trivial task to transpose the dynamic perspective on informational contexts that we advocate here to such probabilistic models. We leave it for future work.
Finally, we should stress that the dynamic perspective on informational contexts is a natural complement, and not an alternative to existing epistemic characterization of solution concepts [35] .
The later offer rich insights on the consequences of taking seriously the informational contexts of strategic interaction. What we proposed here is a first step towards understanding how or why such context might arise.
